War and the art of procrastination

After the assassination of Laurent Kabila there was a long period in which multiple factions in the Congo jostled for power. A prolonged conference in South Africa resulted in agreement about the constitutional principles which all sides would accept. Three years later the new constitution was enacted.

What is very interesting is that the model adopted had strong similarities with the South African one. In the latter case the objective was to protect the rights of minorities such as Afrikaners and the interests represented by the white parties, and minority black parties such as Buthelezi’s Inkhata Freedom Party. The constitution stopped short of the federal model, but it entrenched the concept of provinces with their own elected government and legislature, in which central government could not interfere.

In the Congo, there were similar fears concerning the likelihood of central government being dominated by a single party and a dominant ethnic group. Not surprisingly, the resulting settlement was the same as in South Africa – establishing 15 additional Provinces (making 26 in all) each with their own government and legislature, their own revenue raising powers, and a guaranteed 40% of central government’s revenues.

For cynical politicians the nice thing is that once a constitution has been adopted, it is not so easy to force a government to implement it. In the Congo, where the courts are arms of central government, it is practically impossible.

So, guess what? Nothing has been done. After all, who wants to share power voluntarily?  Only saints like Mandela, not Kabila. So no new provinces have been created, in spite of a constitutional provision that the last date for the process was 36 months after it was enacted. In a belated attempt to rectify the situation, the constitution was hurriedly amended to postpone the creation of new provinces “until circumstances are right.”

As for provincial revenues, they are receiving only half of what they are supposed to get.

This has made a lot of people angry, especially when they contrast conditions in Kinshasa with their own situation. Of course there is always the option of going to war – which is what a lot of people have done. But these local bandits are fighting less for constitutional change than for a slice of the local economic cake, and it’s easier to get that by looting and harassment than entering the political fray. However, the M23, the largest of the current rebel groups, has made more decentralisation of power one of its central demands.

Will they get it? Of course not. Here’s why:

Elections: Provincial elections were supposed to be held last year, but there’s simply no money for them. Nor is there an electoral commission to plan and implement them: the last one was so discredited by the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2011 that a new Act of Parliament has been drafted but there is fierce resistance to government’s proposal by civil society so it has been deferred several times.

Government: Each province is supposed to have ten Ministers and supporting staff. In the case of the 15 new provinces there are no offices for them, and to build them will cost billions and take many years.

Assemblies: Each province is supposed to have a Provincial Assembly with its own supporting staff. Apart from the problem of elections, where will they meet (imagine building 15 houses of parliament), who will pay them, etc etc?

So Kabila and his cabinet are able to claim that they would love to decentralise, but they simply cannot so due to a lack of funds. And that, of course, is the fault of the donors. Nothing to do with political will. Nothing at all.