After the
assassination of Laurent Kabila there was a long period in which multiple
factions in the Congo jostled for power. A prolonged conference in South Africa
resulted in agreement about the constitutional principles which all sides would
accept. Three years later the new constitution was enacted.
What is
very interesting is that the model adopted had strong similarities with the
South African one. In the latter case the objective was to protect the rights
of minorities such as Afrikaners and the interests represented by the white
parties, and minority black parties such as Buthelezi’s Inkhata Freedom Party.
The constitution stopped short of the federal model, but it entrenched the
concept of provinces with their own elected government and legislature, in
which central government could not interfere.
In the
Congo, there were similar fears concerning the likelihood of central government
being dominated by a single party and a dominant ethnic group. Not
surprisingly, the resulting settlement was the same as in South Africa –
establishing 15 additional Provinces (making 26 in all) each with their own government and
legislature, their own revenue raising powers, and a guaranteed 40% of central
government’s revenues.
For cynical
politicians the nice thing is that once a constitution has been adopted, it is
not so easy to force a government to implement it. In the Congo, where the
courts are arms of central government, it is practically impossible.
So, guess
what? Nothing has been done. After all, who wants to share power voluntarily? Only saints like Mandela, not Kabila.
So no new provinces have been created, in spite of a constitutional provision
that the last date for the process was 36 months after it was
enacted. In a belated attempt to rectify the situation, the constitution was
hurriedly amended to postpone the creation of new provinces “until
circumstances are right.”
As for
provincial revenues, they are receiving only half of what they are supposed to
get.
This has
made a lot of people angry, especially when they contrast conditions in
Kinshasa with their own situation. Of course there is always the option of
going to war – which is what a lot of people have done. But these local bandits
are fighting less for constitutional change than for a slice of the local economic
cake, and it’s easier to get that by looting and harassment than entering the political fray. However, the M23, the largest of the
current rebel groups, has made more decentralisation of power one of its
central demands.
Will they
get it? Of course not. Here’s why:
Elections: Provincial elections were supposed to be held
last year, but there’s simply no money for them. Nor is there an electoral
commission to plan and implement them: the last one was so discredited by the
Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2011 that a new Act of Parliament
has been drafted but there is fierce resistance to government’s proposal by
civil society so it has been deferred several times.
Government: Each province is supposed to have ten
Ministers and supporting staff. In the case of the 15 new provinces there are
no offices for them, and to build them will cost billions and take many years.
Assemblies: Each province is supposed to have a Provincial
Assembly with its own supporting staff. Apart from the problem of elections,
where will they meet (imagine building 15 houses of parliament), who will pay
them, etc etc?
So Kabila
and his cabinet are able to claim that they would love to decentralise, but
they simply cannot so due to a lack of funds. And that, of course, is the fault
of the donors. Nothing to do with political will. Nothing at all.